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Structured Abstract: 
 
Purpose 
To evaluate the determinants of supply chain relationships, the provision of supplier support 
measures and the role that support measures play in stimulating investment by suppliers in 
emerging economies.  
  
Design/methodology/approach 
The paper draws on survey evidence for 300 commercial dairy farms in Armenia. The 
identification of potential determinants of supply chain relationships and support programmes 
is based on literature on Supply Chain Management and Transaction Cost Economics. 
 
Findings  
Positive determinants of supplier support programmes are the degree of exclusivity of the 
buyer – supplier relationship, initial capital of the supplier, co-operation between suppliers, 
and foreign ownership of the buyer. Support programmes are less likely to be offered in very 
competitive environments. Support measures such as loans, physical inputs and guaranteed 
prices facilitate supplier investments.  
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Research limitations/implications  
Research is limited to cross-sectional data for a single country and further testing would help 
assess the generalizability of the findings. 
 
Practical implications 
The findings highlight the gains that can be made from openness to international firms. The 
negative competition effect suggests that buyers are constrained in their ability to monitor use 
of the provided services in an environment where a lot of buyers are competing for the same 
supply. Improving the enforcement capability of companies under these circumstances is an 
important challenge for the industry and policy makers. 
 
Originality/value 
The novelty of the study lies in the investigation of the relationships between the nature of 
supply chain linkages and suppliers’ investments. 
 
 
Keywords: 
 
Supply chain management, contractual choice, supplier support programmes, supplier 
investment, dairy, Armenia 
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1. Introduction 
 
Supply chain inefficiencies and disruptions are common problems inhibiting the international 
competitiveness of emerging and transitional economies. Buyers often face inadequacies in 
the quality and quantities of supplies. This has led to enhanced vertical coordination in agri-
food chains. Specifically, enhanced vertical coordination involves buyers providing support 
measures to suppliers, such as credit and physical inputs, as part of a long-term relationship. 
This may overcome market failures and provide a more conducive framework for investment 
by the supplier. However, the provision of such supports is often costly and there is a 
potential for opportunistic behaviour – for instance credit provided to enable the supplier to 
purchase inputs could be diverted to other activities. Curtailing opportunistic behaviour may 
be particularly problematic where transaction costs incurred in monitoring and enforcing 
contracts are high (Blanchard and Kremer, 1997; Gow and Swinnen, 1998; Boger et al., 
2001). 
 
This paper analyses vertical coordination in the Armenian dairy sector, specifically, farm - 
milk processor relationships and the provision and impact of supplier support measures as 
part of these relationships. It addresses three important questions relating to the type of buyer 
– supplier relationship, which suppliers receive support measures and whether such support 
induces investments by suppliers.  Econometric analysis thus models the determinants of: (a) 
contractual choice; (b) supplier support measures and (c) farm level investment, drawing on a 
sample of 300 commercial dairy farms. The Armenian dairy sector, as in many other 
emerging and transitional economies, has suffered from inadequate investment in the supply 
base, with, by international standards, poor quality and productivity. Investment at the farm 
level is crucial to improving the efficiency and international competitiveness of the whole 
supply chain.  
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Recent supply chain management research emphasizes the critical role of buyer – supplier 
relationships for supply chain management strategies in general (Tan, 2001) and, specifically, 
within the agri-food sector (Fischer et al., 2010). This relationship may also include supplier 
development, defined as any effort of a buying firm to increase the capabilities of the supplier 
(Krause and Ellram, 1997). Although much has been written on buyer – supplier relationships 
and supplier development (Ellram, 1991), there is a lack of empirical models for establishing 
successful buyer – supplier partnerships (Tan, 2001; Fischer and Reynolds, 2010). The study 
is thus opportune and contributes to the wider literature on supplier development strategies as 
a key component of supply chain management (Monczka et al., 1993; Krause and Ellram, 
1997; Wagner, 2006; Rogers et al., 2007). As far as we are aware, it is one of the first to 
assess the linkages between supplier support measures and actual investment by suppliers.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first provide an overview of the 
potential nature of buyer – supplier relationships and the rationale for the choice of contract 
and the provision of supplier support programmes. This is followed by a description of the 
Armenian dairy supply chain and the rural finance sector to provide context for our study. We 
then discuss the dataset and the data collection process. Next, we present descriptive statistics 
before introducing an investment model and analysing the determinants of contractual choice, 
supplier support and investment. Relevant conclusions are drawn in the final section. 
 
 
2. Supply chain relationships and supplier support programmes 
 
2.1 Governance of exchange relationships 
Exchange relationships have been conceptualised as a continuum, differing in their degree of 
interaction, from spot markets at one extreme to vertical ownership integration at the other 
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(Anderson et al., 1994). Spot markets, as a governance mechanism, involve immediate market 
transactions with no prior or post purchase commitments beyond fulfilling the given 
exchange. They provide buyers with flexibility but limit their ability to control the quality and 
quantity of goods available for sale. Vertical integration, by incorporating two stages of the 
supply chain within a single firm, should lower procurement risks and increase control over 
quality. However, the dissipation of resources in vertical ownership integration places a 
relatively high demand on capital and may dull managerial incentives (Bhuyan, 2002). Firms 
may possess core competencies in one stage of the supply chain, but lack the knowhow and 
skills to be effective in another. As a result, intermediate or hybrid arrangements, where 
autonomous firms maintain contracting / partnership arrangements, have become increasingly 
common (Sporleder, 1992; Hobbs and Young, 2000). When working effectively, hybrid 
forms should give downstream agents improved control over product quality and quantity, 
without dissipating managerial efforts.  
 
For simplicity, and following the approach of Fischer et al. (2009), we group the different 
types of exchange relationships into two major contract types: spot markets and informal or 
relational contracts are referred to as implicit contracts, 1 while written contracts and cross-
shareholding arrangements are referred to as explicit contracts. The degree of vertical 
coordination or integration is higher for explicit, compared to implicit, contracting 
relationships.  
 
2.2 Determinants of exchange relationships and supplier support 
Tighter vertical coordination can help reduce business uncertainty, improve access to essential 
resources and result in higher business productivity (Dyer and Singh, 1998). In emerging and 
transition countries, improved access to resources is crucial to overcome problems of quality 
6 
 
and volume of supplies (Sahay et al., 2003). Providing access to resources can be part of 
supplier development programmes, which may include a range of “activities undertaken by a 
buying firm to improve either supplier performance, or supplier capabilities, or both, and to 
meet the buying firm’s short- and/or long term supply needs” (Krause et al., 2007, p.34). The 
most common support tools included in supplier development programmes are: credit, loan 
guarantees, physical inputs, guaranteed prices and prompt payments (Gow and Swinnen, 
2001; Krause et al., 2000; Krause et al., 2007; Wagner, 2006).  
 
Hypothesis 1a: Improving access to resources requires tight vertical coordination and 
therefore more explicit contracts. Access to resources is more problematic for resource-
restricted suppliers so we expect these suppliers to have more explicit contracts. 
Hypothesis 1b: Supplier support programmes are provided to overcome market failures and 
restrictions faced by suppliers in fulfilling buyers’ requirements in terms of quantity and 
quality of products. Therefore, more resource-restricted suppliers are more likely to benefit 
from supplier support programmes. 
 
Market competition represents environmental uncertainty because it increases the 
opportunities for suppliers (or buyers) to switch to another buyer (supplier). Under such 
circumstances, the use of more explicit contracts becomes attractive as it lowers the risk of 
losing a trading partner (McCluskey and O’Rourke, 2000; Reynolds et al., 2009). Supplier 
development programmes may also generate greater scope for opportunistic behaviour: 
suppliers may divert support measures to unintended uses or they may switch buyers after 
having received support.  However, in some cases tangible incentives – such as supplier 
support – may also be used to protect against violations of contractual agreements (Klein et 
al., 1978; Zaharieva et al., 2003). For example, if input markets are inefficient, access to 
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credit through a particular contract with a buyer acts as a powerful incentive not to break an 
agreed arrangement. Furthermore, supplier support programmes may also emerge in a reactive 
manner – a buyer may seek to prevent suppliers from switching to a competing firm which 
has introduced such measures. In this case, the competition effect actually works in favour of 
the spread of supplier support programmes. The spill over effects of one firm offering supplier 
support measures may be considerable (Gow et al., 2000).  
 
Hypothesis 2a: Greater uncertainty in the buyer – supplier relationship due to the possibility 
of opportunistic behaviour, increases the use of explicit contracts. 
Hypothesis 2b: Self-enforcement of the buyer – supplier agreement is an important 
prerequisite for the sustainability of supplier support programmes. A higher likelihood of 
opportunistic behaviour by suppliers decreases the availability of supplier support 
programmes. On the other hand, competition between buyers may also increase the 
availability of supplier support programmes through spill over effects. 
 
Agri-food supply chains are especially prone to problems of information asymmetry between 
buyers and suppliers because many food quality characteristics are credence attributes 
(Gorton et al., 2006; Young and Hobbs, 2002). To overcome the problem of information 
asymmetry, companies are increasingly using explicit contracts and ownership integration 
(Fischer et al., 2009). An example of information asymmetry in the case of supplier 
development programmes is that buyers cannot easily observe if supplier support measures 
are used in ways intended by the principal. This information asymmetry may deter the buyer 
from providing supplier support (Gow and Swinnen, 2001). 
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Hypothesis 3a: Information asymmetries lead to greater use of explicit contracts. Conversely, 
initiatives that help to overcome the problem of asymmetric information may reduce the need 
for explicit contracts. 
Hypothesis 3b: Asymmetric information between the buyer and the supplier decreases the 
likelihood of support programmes. Initiatives that help to overcome the problem of 
asymmetric information increase the likelihood of supplier development. 
 
3. Background on the Armenian dairy and rural finance sector 
3.1 The Armenian dairy supply chain 
Animal husbandry is one of the main branches of Armenian agriculture and is of critical 
importance for small-scale farms. The vast majority of producers own fewer than 8 cows (see 
Table 1). Livestock farms face a number of obstacles, hampering their operational efficiency. 
The absence of affordable, high quality feeds, expensive veterinary services, a lack of 
artificial insemination and ineffective management practices make the industry highly volatile 
and seasonal. This negatively affects productivity and the competitiveness of locally produced 
milk compared to imported milk powder. Typically, less than one half of produced milk is 
sold to dairy processing companies. The remainder is used to feed calves, sold unofficially to 
consumers or consumed by farm households (Avetisyan, 2008).  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
The dairy processing industry in Armenia is comprised of about 250 companies. In order to 
overcome the problems related to the seasonality of local milk supply, most processors rely 
heavily on imported milk powder to stabilize their production levels year-round. While 
official data suggest that during recent years milk powder comprised only about 8-12% of 
total milk procured by the dairy companies, other studies show that there is also an important 
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additional share of shadow imports of milk powder into the country (Asatryan and Eroyants, 
2010). 
 
3.2 The rural finance sector 
Although the financial and banking sector has experienced steady growth in Armenia, options 
for agriculture are more limited. The vast majority of Armenian banks refrain from financing 
agriculture. By the end of 2012 there were 21 commercial banks with 467 branches operating 
in Armenia. Only about 5.5% of total credit investments of these commercial banks went to 
agriculture in 2012. Banks consider agriculture a high risk sector and impose higher rates and 
shorter repayment periods for provided loans. On average the interest rates on agricultural 
loans provided to farmers by commercial banks and credit organizations vary between 8 and 
22% (Urutyan, 2012).  
 
The overall level of institutional development in Armenia is an important limiting factor when 
it comes to establishing business relationships between agricultural producers who require 
funds and banks which have those funds. These institutional failures include limitations in the 
use of real estate as collateral due to the lack of properly functioning land registry offices, the 
lack of regulations regarding other forms of loan security and uncertainty regarding the 
enforceability of claims on borrowers in default. In addition, a market for agricultural 
insurance does not exist in Armenia. As a result, local producers must contend not only with 
the risks inherent in the fluctuation of prices on the market but also the specific risks inherent 
in extensive agricultural production and a low level of productivity. Hence, farmers who are 
considering taking out loans face huge uncertainty regarding the profitability of planned 
projects if these projects have to be financed with funds obtained at high interest rates 
(Urutyan, 2012).  
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Despite some signs of improvement in recent years – e.g. in the period 2005-2012 total 
agricultural credits grew at approximately 35% per annum – important credit constraints 
remain. This is especially true for the majority of Armenian farm households, which are 
small-scale, poorly capitalized and face fluctuating and uncertain cash flows throughout the 
year. These conditions put a strain on the restructuring and upgrading – in terms of quality 
production and volumes – of the agricultural sector. With the formal rural finance sector 
offering few opportunities to small Armenian milk producers, it is crucial to improve 
comprehension of the role of supply chain relationships in overcoming credit constraints in 
the sector (Urutyan, 2012). 
 
4. Data and data collection methodology 
 
To gain a better understanding of commercial milk buyer – supplier relationships, a survey 
was conducted in 2006. The population of interest was defined as primary producers which 
sold cows’ milk to another supply chain actor. Therefore, farmers without dairy cows, those 
who did not sell any of the milk produced or who processed all milk into cheese or other dairy 
products (i.e. did not sell any raw milk) were excluded from the study. To obtain the sample, a 
quota of 300 responses was set with the intention of including a representative cross-section 
of commercial dairy farms, including both household producers that marketed at least part of 
their output and agricultural companies. Respondents were drawn from all regions (Marzes) 
which have significant commercial milk production, based on proportions drawn from 
statistical data on milk production. A stratified random sample was employed with quotas for 
each region based on statistical data from Milk Production in the Marzes of Armenia (NSSA, 
2004). Regions where milk production was not developed commercially were excluded from 
the sample. On the other hand, visits to the villages revealed that there are regions with highly 
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commercialized farmers working with many dairy processors. In this case, it was decided to 
increase the number of farmers to be surveyed from such regions. Table 2 details the sampling 
plan.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Suitable farms were identified from contacts with national statistical agencies, local and 
regional authorities, village mayors, local livestock experts and agricultural agencies. Data 
were collected through face-to-face interviews. The dataset by herd size is presented in Table 
3, with the typical commercial dairy farm in Armenia having between 5 and 20 milking cows. 
Comparing the size distribution of farmers in the sample (Table 3) with the overall size 
distribution of Armenian milk producers (Table 1), we observe that the sample is not 
representative of the total sector. Small farms have been underrepresented in the sample: more 
than 50% of the farms in our sample have a herd size of 8 cows or more, while this is the case 
for less than 4% of the total Armenian dairy sector. Given our sampling strategy – specifically 
excluding non-commercial dairy farms in line with the objectives of our research question – 
this is, however, unsurprising.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
 
5. Supply chain relationships and on-farm investments in the Armenian dairy sector 
 
5.1 Description of milk buyer – supplier relationships 
Before presenting the econometric analysis related to supplier investment, we briefly describe 
the vertical relationships between milk producers and buyers in the Armenian dairy supply 
chain. Dairy processors are the most common main buyers of milk from farmers. Over three 
quarters of sampled farms sell directly to dairy processors. Another 20% of dairy farms sell 
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through a co-operative. The remainder of milk is collected by intermediaries: dairy logistics 
or collecting firms. The majority of sampled farms sell milk based on a contractual 
arrangement: 38% have signed a written contract with the milk buyer; 36% sell milk based on 
an oral contract; and only a quarter of the sampled farms have not entered into a contractual 
agreement. 
 
The relationships that exist between buyers and sellers are often much more extensive than 
simple agreements on price, volumes and delivery conditions. Table 4 shows that supply 
chain relationships in the Armenian dairy sector also involve a wide range of support 
measures. The most prevalent types of support are prompt payments and quality control, 
which are received by over 80 per cent of sampled farms. Around 30 per cent also receive 
credit from their main buyer. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
Considering the investment activities of the sampled farms reveals that the majority of 
respondents had made on-farm investments in the previous five years (period 2001 – 2006). 
Almost 50% of the sampled farms have invested in animal housing, 31% reported purchasing 
cooling tanks, milk lines, cows and other dairy-specific investments and 19% have made 
general investments related to land and non-dairy specific agricultural equipment. 
 
 
5.2 Determinants of supply chain relationships and supplier support programmes 
Firstly, the analysis considers the determinants of the supply chain relationship and the 
elements that determine access to support programmes. The explanatory variables in these 
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models are directly related to the three hypotheses that were derived in section 2. The 
relationships that we estimate are the following: 
 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐿𝐼𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖
+ 𝛽4𝐵𝑈𝑌𝐸𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                                                                                   (1) 
 
 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑖 = 𝛽′0 + 𝛽′1𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽′2𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽′3𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖
+ 𝛽′4𝐵𝑈𝑌𝐸𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                                                                                  (2) 
 
 
where EXPLICIT is a measure of the contractual relationship between buyer and supplier; 
SUPPORT is a measure of access to farm support programmes; RESOURCES characterizes 
how resource-restricted the milk producer is; OPPORTUNISM is a measure of the potential 
for opportunistic behaviour; INFORMATION identifies the level of information asymmetry 
between buyer and supplier; BUYER includes additional variables that relate to the 
characteristics of the buyer company; and finally 𝜀 is the error term. 
 
EXPLICIT is a dummy taking the value of one if the buyer – supplier relationship is based on 
a written contract and it is zero in the case of an oral contract or a spot market relationship. 
SUPPORT is a dummy taking the value of one if the farm received support from the main 
buyer of milk. The support categories included are: credit; investment loans; farm loan 
guarantees; physical inputs. RESOURCES is measured by the existing capital stock of the 
farm. Since the main capital assets in Armenian dairy farms are the cattle, we follow the 
approach of Petrick (2004) by using the number of cows on the farm in the year 2001 as an 
indicator. It is expected that smaller, hence more resource-restricted, farms are more likely to 
have explicit contracts and have greater need for supplier support measures.  
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OPPORTUNISM is a vector of variables (COMPETITION and SHARE). COMPETITION 
measures the number of potential buyers of milk that a farmer has access to and hence 
characterises the degree of competition between buyers in the market. More competition in 
the market creates greater uncertainty for the buyer who will be more inclined to engage in 
explicit contracts with suppliers. On the other hand, contracts are more difficult to enforce in a 
competitive market and hence providing support is more risky (Poulton et al., 2004). The 
expected effect of COMPETITION on the likelihood of support is negative. SHARE refers to 
the share of the farm’s total milk production that is sold to the main buyer. We expect that a 
more exclusive relationship with the main buyer (i.e. a higher share of milk sold to this 
trading partner) leads to a higher degree of dependence and commitment and hence a lower 
probability of opportunistic behaviour (Krause et al., 2000). An implicit contract may suffice 
for governing the relationship under these circumstances. On the other hand, an explicit 
contract can formalise the dependence and commitment within the relationship. We expect 
SHARE to increase the likelihood of the supplier receiving support. The effect on contract 
choice is ambiguous. 
 
INFORMATION is a vector of variables (COLLECT and COOPERATE) that relate to the 
asymmetry of information in the buyer – supplier relationship. COLLECT is a dummy that 
takes the value of 1 if milk is collected by the buyer from the farm instead of through a village 
collection centre. On-farm collection should provide better opportunities for the buyer to 
monitor and check up on the supplier. This should increase the likelihood of support measures 
but decrease the need for explicit contracting. COOPERATE is a dummy that takes the value 
of one if the farmer indicates that s/he is co-operating with other farmers to store, market or 
process milk, to buy inputs, or to engage in lobbying activities. Greater co-operation between 
farmers may lead to greater discipline among farmers, the development of good practices and 
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a denser network in which information flows more fluently. This may also have a positive 
impact on the likelihood of receiving support. 
 
Finally, BUYER includes two indicators of the characteristics of the buyer (TYPE and FDI). 
Buyer type (TYPE) is a dummy that takes the value of one if the buyer is a corporate dairy 
processor and zero if the buyer is a co-operative or an intermediary milk collecting company. 
FDI is a dummy that takes the value of one if the buyer is a foreign owned company or if the 
buyer is exporting dairy products. In both instances we expect that internationally focused 
buyers are better resourced, having the necessary financial means to provide support 
programmes (Dries and Swinnen, 2004; Dries et al., 2009). Furthermore, foreign companies 
may be more inclined to use explicit contracts because local market and business uncertainty 
may be higher for them. FDI is expected to have a positive effect on the likelihood of explicit 
contracts and support. Table 5 provides summary statistics of the variables included in models 
(1) and (2). Tests show that correlation between the explanatory variables is limited with a 
maximum correlation coefficient between TYPE and COOPERATE of 31%. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
5.3 Determinants of on-farm investment 
 
The model that we employ to analyse the determinants of on-farm investment is based on 
Elhorst (1993) and Petrick (2004). The model was adapted in keeping with Dries and 
Swinnen (2010) to answer the specific research question related to the impact of support 
programmes on investments and to deal with a number of data limitations. We estimate the 
following empirical model: 
 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                                        (3) 
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where INVEST measures farm investment, SUPPORT is a vector of variables measuring 
support programmes from the dairy; CONTROL is a vector of control variables; and 𝜀 is the 
error term. 
 
INVEST is a dummy taking the value of one if the milk supplier made an investment in farm 
assets2 over the five year period of study (years 2001 to 2006) and it takes the value of zero if 
no investment was made in the specified period.3  
 
The first set of variables (SUPPORT) includes several indicators of dairy assistance 
programmes.  PLOAN is a dummy that takes the value of one if a supplier is delivering to a 
dairy company that offers financial assistance, in other words, if the supplier has access to 
dairy processor loans, credit or bank loan guarantee programmes that improve access to 
external financial resources. INPUTS is a dummy that takes the value of one if the supplier 
receives physical inputs from the buyer and is zero in the other case. Apart from the direct 
impact on investments through processor loans, dairy input supply programmes are likely to 
have an indirect impact on suppliers’ investments by enhancing the profitability of the farm 
by lowering input costs, or reducing transaction costs in accessing inputs.  We expect, 
therefore, PLOAN and INPUTS to have a positive effect on INVEST. Other factors that may 
cause an indirect impact on the likelihood to invest are the provision of guaranteed prices 
(PRICE) and prompt payments (PAYMENT). Price guarantees and the absence of payment 
delays reduce the riskiness of the business environment for the supplier. As a result, farms 
may be more inclined to invest than in more uncertain situations. 
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The control variables (CONTROL) are related to the farm and the farmer. The expected sign 
of the variable RESOURCES depends on the optimal size of the capital stock. A negative sign 
implies that larger farms are less likely to invest than small farms and consequently, that farm 
sizes are likely to converge. A positive sign would lead to the opposite conclusion and farm 
sizes diverge. Apart from efforts to achieve the optimal capital stock, RESOURCES may also 
capture a different effect on investment decisions. Larger farms may benefit from reputation 
effects and the availability of more collateral. Furthermore, larger farms may benefit from 
more frequent interactions with the dairy company (Fafchamps, 1997; Johnson et al., 2002; 
McMillan and Woodruff, 1999). This second effect suggests that RESOURCES has a positive 
effect on the likelihood to invest.   
 
COOPERATE is a dummy that takes the value of one if the farmer indicates that s/he is 
cooperating with other farmers to store, market or process milk, to buy inputs, or to engage in 
lobbying activities. We expect that more cooperation generates countervailing power and 
leads to a denser network that creates more social capital, which facilitates investment. Table 
5 provides summary statistics of the variables included in Model (3). 
 
 
5.4 Regression results 
 
Equations (1), (2) and (3) are estimated using logit regression models. The results for the 
determinants of the supply chain relationship are presented in Table 6. Results for the 
provision of supplier support programmes are shown in Table 7. Results of the investment 
model are presented in Table 8. 
 
Table 6 shows that the use of explicit contracts is less likely in an environment with greater 
competition between buyers (COMPETITION). This result rejects hypothesis 2a which 
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claimed that explicit contracts are more likely to occur in competitive environments because 
they help to lower the risk of losing trading partners to competitors. The hypothesis, however, 
assumes the enforceability of explicit contracts. In emerging and transition countries, public 
contract enforcement institutions may not be adequately developed or may function 
inefficiently (Gow and Swinnen, 2001). This can explain our result. SHARE has a positive 
and significant coefficient and indicates that suppliers that are more dependent on their main 
buyer of milk are more likely to have an explicit contract. In other words, explicit contracts 
formalise the dependence and commitment that is present in the buyer-supplier relationship. 
 
In line with our expectations, export-oriented firms and companies with foreign direct 
investments are more likely to use explicit contracts than locally oriented companies (FDI). 
This may be because foreign firms are more vulnerable to uncertainties about local business 
and market conditions, or foreign firms may just adopt explicit contracts as it is the way of 
doing business in the home market. Another reason may be that foreign firms are more 
demanding in terms of quality and reliability and explicit contracts are offered to reward 
compliant suppliers. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 
Table 7 shows that larger suppliers (RESOURCES) have better access to support from the 
buyer. This result rejects hypothesis 1b which claims that support programmes are provided to 
more resource-restricted suppliers to allow them to fulfil the buyer’s requirements in terms of 
quality and quantity. One explanation for this result may be that ‘large suppliers’ in the 
context of the Armenian dairy sector are still relatively small and hence resource-restricted. 
Another explanation may be that relatively large suppliers benefit from a stronger bargaining 
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position vis-à-vis the buyer and are able to negotiate more favourable contract terms. 
Furthermore, transaction costs will be lower if support is given to a small number of larger 
suppliers compared against dealing with a mass of small suppliers.  
 
With respect to hypothesis 2b, COMPETITION has a significantly negative sign which 
suggests that milk buyers that operate in a more competitive environment are less likely to 
offer farm support to their suppliers. This result is in line with our hypothesis. The risk of 
losing suppliers to competitors after support has been provided may be a genuine deterrent for 
buyers to implement assistance programmes. This finding is also confirmed by Poulton et al. 
(2004) who report a negative effect of a competitive buying market on supplier support in the 
African cotton sector. Furthermore, we find that suppliers that have a more exclusive 
relationship with the buyer (i.e. a higher share of milk being sold to the main buyer, SHARE) 
have a higher likelihood of receiving support. This confirms the hypothesis that a more 
dependent relationship decreases the chance of opportunistic behaviour and hence improves 
the possibilities for support. 
 
Hypothesis 3b is confirmed by the significantly positive impact of COOPERATE on the 
likelihood of receiving supplier support. The positive effect of cooperation points to the value 
of being part of an extensive network which might help to overcome information problems. 
Another reason might be improved discipline amongst group members and the higher 
collective volume of output makes them more attractive recipients of support. COLLECT, on 
the other hand, has a significantly negative coefficient. Collecting milk from the farm lowers 
the likelihood of receiving support. The improvement in monitoring capabilities of the buyer 
appears to be negligible for explaining better support opportunities. 
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Finally, the results show that corporate dairy companies (TYPE) are less inclined to offer 
support to their suppliers. In other words, farmers supplying co-operative buyers are more 
likely to benefit from farm assistance. As expected, export-oriented firms and buyers with 
foreign direct investments (FDI) offer more farm support to their suppliers than domestic 
firms. This finding is in line with the hypothesis that international firms have easier access to 
the financial resources that are necessary to provide these programmes.  
 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
Table 8 presents the estimations of the determinants of supplier investment. We are 
particularly interested in the effect that different buyer support programmes have on the 
likelihood of suppliers to invest. First, access to dairy loans, credit and bank loan guarantees 
plays a significant role in improving the probability of investments by suppliers. This 
indicates that access to credit through formal channels (rural finance sector) may be restricted 
and that dairy loans are crucial to overcome this market imperfection and the sector’s 
financial constraints.  
 
Apart from the direct impact of investments through loans and credit, buyers’ input supply 
programmes increase the propensity to invest indirectly by enhancing the profitability of the 
farm by lowering input costs, or reducing transaction costs in accessing inputs. As discussed 
above, the Armenian dairy sector faces serious obstacles with respect to access to quality 
inputs such as animal feed, veterinary services and insemination material. This lowers 
productivity and the profitability of dairy farms. Overcoming input constraints through 
supplier development programmes is therefore crucial to improve profitability and 
consequently investment opportunities.  
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Table 8 also provides evidence of the importance of reducing the riskiness of the business 
environment to stimulate supplier investment. Providing guaranteed prices significantly 
increases the farmer’s likelihood to invest. As was shown in section 3, credit constraints are 
significant in the Armenian agricultural sector and the dairy sector may suffer even more as a 
result of the lumpy nature of dairy farming investments. Fluctuating prices add to the 
uncertainty of farm cash flows and significantly hamper investments. Finally, farm size 
(RESOURCES) plays only a minor role in explaining on-farm investment, while co-operation 
between suppliers increases the likelihood to invest significantly. 
 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study contributes to the supply chain literature by analysing the determinants of supply 
chain relationships, the provision of supplier support measures and their impact on supplier 
investment. A study of supplier development programmes in the Armenian dairy sector is 
relevant because the sector suffers from a number of challenges. On the one hand, 
productivity and the quality of primary production is low which puts the sector at a 
competitive disadvantage and leads to imports of milk powder and a deteriorating self-
sufficiency rate. On the other hand, upgrading of the supplier base is hampered by a number 
of institutional failures – e.g. affecting the use of collateral and access to external (bank) 
capital. Supplier support measures as a component of buyer – supplier relationships therefore 
play a crucial role in the dairy sector restructuring process and in improving the sector’s long-
term prospects. 
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The evidence suggests that the provision of supplier support measures is significant but that 
buyers discriminate in terms of who receives them, with the more costly the measure, the 
fewer the number of suppliers that benefit.  Analysis of the determinants of the provision of 
supplier support measures indicates that suppliers that have a more exclusive relationship with 
the buyer and those that deliver to more internationally oriented buyers (be it exporters or FDI 
firms) are more likely to receive support. In contrast, buyers that operate in a more 
competitive market are less likely to provide support to their suppliers. These results provide 
support for the theoretical underpinnings of the study, namely that restricting opportunistic 
behaviour of suppliers is crucial for enforcing supplier development programmes as part of 
the contractual agreement. 
 
The findings generate implications of wider importance for practitioners and policymakers. 
On the one hand, our results seem to point to the gains that can be derived from openness to 
international firms – which bring in the financial means and experience to provide supplier 
support programmes. On the other hand, the negative competition effect may indicate that 
buyers are limited in their ability to enforce repayment of the provided services in an 
environment where many buyers are competing for the same supply. To improve the 
functioning of supply chains, policy makers should improve the enforcement capability of 
buyers under these circumstances. Better legal enforcement would reduce the prevalence of 
opportunism (Johnson et al., 2002). The latter is likely to induce significant positive spill over 
effects, given that lower opportunism improves the probability of supplier development. 
Evidence from other studies also indicates that private initiatives can stimulate sustainable 
supplier development programmes, in competitive markets, through special institutional 
arrangements such as frequent monitoring, buyer coordination, or local information networks 
(Swinnen and Maertens, 2007). 
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The second set of results extends knowledge on the relationship between the provision of 
supplier support programmes and supplier investment. The study finds that supplier support 
programmes play an important role in stimulating investment by suppliers. However, the 
results point to a rather nuanced view recognizing that supplier assistance programmes affect 
investment decisions in several ways. First, dairy loans, credit and loan guarantee 
programmes directly improve suppliers’ access to financial resources. Second, buyers’ 
physical input supply programmes increase the propensity to invest indirectly by enhancing 
the profitability of the supplier by lowering input costs and by reducing transaction costs in 
accessing inputs. Finally, support programmes reduce uncertainty and the riskiness of the 
business environment by providing guaranteed prices and prompt payments. All these 
elements have an important effect on the likelihood of investment by suppliers. This is of 
critical importance given the structural problems that affect the Armenian dairy sector, which 
are common to many industries in transitional economies.  
 
The findings point to future research possibilities. For instance, the results regarding the 
inadequacy of contract enforcement in competitive or uncertain environments merits further 
investigation. In emerging economies, the legal framework for contract enforcement is only 
slowly developing. Undertaking in-depth, case study based analysis of the conditions under 
which contract enforcement is successful in Armenia or extending the analysis to a cross-
country survey of this issue can improve our understanding of the private solutions that may 
exist to overcome public failure in providing contract enforcement institutions. This would be 
an interesting extension to the current study that has focused on private solutions to input and 
credit market failure.  
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Table 1. Size distribution in the Armenian dairy sector 
 
Size class < 8 cows 8-14 cows 15–99 cows > 99 cows Total 
Number of farms  167,134 4,057 2,476 49 173,716 
% of farms 96.2 2.3 1.4 0.0 100 
Source: Hovhannisyan (2008) 
 
 
Table 2. Sampling plan 
Milk production in Marzes  Proportional sampling Final sample 
 In tsd 
tonnes 
% in total   
Yerevan 3.6 1 3 0 
Aragatsotn 64.1 12 36 20 
Ararat 41.4 7 21 23 
Armavir 35.9 6 18 0 
Gegharkunik 98.7 18 54 57 
Lori 65.4 12 36 39 
Kotayk 56.9 10 30 20 
Shirak 83 15 45 71 
Syunik 47.1 8 24 60 
Vayots Dzor 21 4 12 0 
Tavush 38.1 7 21 10 
Total 555.2 100 300 300 
Source: National Statistics Year book 2004 and INTAS Survey Guidelines 
 
 
Table 3: Number of milking cows per commercial farm  
No of milking cows No of farms in the sample Share of farms in total sample (%) 
 < 4 4 1.3 
4-5 66 22 
6-7 72 24 
8-9 39 13 
10 to 19 77 25.7 
20 to 49 29 9.7 
50 to 99 8 2.7 
100+ 5 1.7 
Total 300 100 
Mean 13.4 - 
Standard Deviation 18.5 - 
Source: Survey data  
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Table 4: Percentage of suppliers receiving support from their main buyer 
Support measure % of suppliers receiving 
support 
Prompt payments 87.7 
Quality control 82.7 
Guaranteed prices 46.7 
Market access 40.0 
Credit 30.7 
Veterinary support 23.7 
Transportation 20.3 
Physical inputs 16.3 
Business and financial management support 4.0 
Farm loan guarantees 4.0 
Specialist storage 2.0 
Investment loans 1.7 
Machinery 1.7 
Source: Survey data  
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics for variables included in the regression models 
Variable Variable description % sample 
(dummy) 
or average 
Std. dev. 
EXPLICIT 
SUPPORT 
o.w. PLOAN 
 
o.w. INPUTS 
o.w. PRICE 
o.w. PAYMENT 
INVEST 
INVESTd 
1 if written contract 
1 if support provided by buyer 
1 if credit, investment loan or loan 
guarantee provided by buyer 
1 if inputs provided by buyer 
1 if guaranteed prices provided 
1 if no payment delays 
1 if on-farm investment in 5 years 
1 if dairy-specific investment in 5 years 
38.0 
37.3 
35.0 
 
16.3 
46.7 
87.7 
72.7 
40.0 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Hypothesis 1 
 
RESOURCES 
Resource-restricted suppliers 
 
Number of dairy cows 
 
 
8.5 
 
 
13.2 
Hypothesis 2 
 
COMPETITION 
 
Competition / opportunistic behaviour 
 
Number of potential milk buyers for the 
farmer’s milk 
 
 
2.0 
 
 
 
1.9 
SHARE 
 
Share of total milk production delivered 
to the main buyer 
86.4 
 
18.3 
 
Hypothesis 3 
 
COLLECT 
COOPERATE 
Information asymmetry 
 
1 if on-farm milk collection 
1 if farmer co-operates with other 
farmers to store, market or process milk, 
to buy inputs, or to lobby 
 
 
70.0 
29.3 
 
 
- 
- 
TYPE 
FDI 
1 if buyer is a corporate dairy 
1 if buyer is foreign-owned dairy or 
exporter of dairy products 
76.0 
22.0 
 
- 
- 
Source: Survey data 
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Table 6. Determinants of supply chain relationship 
 
EXPLICIT Coefficient Standard Error Significance a 
Hypothesis 1a 
RESOURCES 
 
-0.001 
 
0.010 
 
 
Hypothesis 2a 
COMPETITION 
 
-0.186 
 
0.085 
 
** 
SHARE 0.014 0.008 * 
Hypothesis 3a 
COLLECT 
COOPERATE 
 
-0.347 
-0.400 
 
0.282 
0.295 
 
 
 
TYPE 
FDI 
0.533 
1.156 
0.334 
0.312 
 
*** 
Constant -1.287 0.732 * 
Observations: 300 
Pseudo R2: 0.06 
   
a The significance level is indicated as follows: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10% 
Source: Own calculations based on survey data 
 
 
Table 7: Determinants of farm support programmes 
 
SUPPORT Coefficient Standard Error Significance a 
Hypothesis 1b 
RESOURCES 
 
0.032 
 
0.012 
 
*** 
Hypothesis 2b 
COMPETITION 
 
-0.170 
 
0.085 
 
** 
SHARE 0.030 0.010 *** 
Hypothesis 3b 
COLLECT 
COOPERATE 
 
-1.054 
0.711 
 
0.332 
0.317 
 
*** 
** 
TYPE 
FDI 
-2.376 
1.920 
0.373 
0.367 
*** 
*** 
Constant -1.335 0.847  
Observations: 300 
Pseudo R2: 0.24 
   
a The significance level is indicated as follows: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10% 
Source: Own calculations based on survey data 
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Table 8: Determinants of on-farm investment 
INVEST Coefficient Standard Error Significance a 
PLOAN 
INPUTS 
PRICE 
PAYMENT 
1.126 
1.682 
0.959 
0.363 
0.402 
0.783 
0.302 
0.408 
*** 
** 
*** 
 
RESOURCES 
COOPERATE 
0.038 
1.059 
0.022 
0.377 
* 
*** 
Constant -0.696 0.423  
Observations: 300 
Pseudo R2: 0.169 
   
a The significance level is indicated as follows: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10% 
Source: Own calculations based on survey data 
 
 
                                                 
1  There is an extensive literature on relational and implicit contracts that instead of using formal, written 
agreements rely on reputation, trust and unwritten codes of conduct as a means of coordination. Many observers, 
from Barnard (1938) and Simon (1947) onwards, have emphasized the importance of such informal agreements.  
2 Farm assets include investments in animal housing facilities (building, enlarging or modernizing stalls, sheds 
and herdsman’s camps); dairy-specific investments (buying new calves and cows, milk lines, cooling tanks and 
fodder mixers); and general investments that are not specifically related to milk production such as buying new 
land, pastures, investments in fences and general agricultural equipment. 
3 Dries and Swinnen (2010) show that dairy-specific investments are more likely to be financed through supplier 
support programmes because the interdependency between buyer and supplier is higher in the situation of 
transaction-specific investments. We therefore also estimated an investment model with the dependent variable 
being a dummy that takes the value of one if an investment was made in a dairy-specific asset. However, this did 
not lead to interesting, new insights and we do not report these results here. 
